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Abstract
Cognitive control theories predict enhanced conflict adaptation after punishment. However, no such effect was found
in previous work. In the present study, we demonstrate in a flanker task how behavioural adjustments following
punishment signals are highly dependent on punishment sensitivity (as measured by the Behavioural Inhibition
System (BIS) scale): Whereas low punishment-sensitive participants do show increased conflict adaptation after
punishment, high punishment-sensitive participants show no such modulation. Interestingly, participants with a high
punishment-sensitivity showed an overall reaction time increase after punishments. Our results stress the role of
individual differences in explaining motivational modulations of cognitive control.
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Introduction
The subject of cognitive control, the ability to monitor our
environment and adapt to ever-changing contexts, has been of
increasing interest to psychologists over the past decades.
However, the interactions between cognitive-control
mechanisms and motivational variables are not well
understood. Previous studies have demonstrated how overall
conflict processing [1], as well as adaptations to conflict [2,3],
can be enhanced after reward. While we have these first
notions on the role of reward in modulating cognitive control,
the influence of punishment on conflict adaptation remains
unclear. However, we encounter negative feedback all the time
(e.g., annoying computer beeps indicating wrong key presses)
and it is important to understand how these signals interact
with cognitive processes. In the present study, we set out to
investigate if, how, and when, punishment can modulate trial-
to-trial adaptations to cognitive conflict.
In research on cognitive control, conflict tasks are typically
used. In the flanker task [4], for example, in which the central
target is presented together with either congruent (> > >) or
incongruent (> < >) flankers, participants respond faster and
more accurately on congruent trials compared to incongruent
trials (i.e., the flanker effect). Interestingly, Gratton, Coles, and
Donchin [5] observed that there was a smaller flanker effect
after incongruent than after congruent trials (termed the conflict
adaptation or Gratton effect). There are a number of different
frameworks dealing with this Gratton effect and we will discuss
three of the most prominent theoretical models. These models
all differ in describing the exact mechanics for explaining the
Gratton effect, and the role of motivational variables there-in.
Interestingly, however, all three models predict a similar
modulation by punishment.
According to the Conflict Monitoring Theory (CMT) [6,7],
conflict, as an aversive signal [8-10], is detected by the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) which triggers subsequent behavioural
adaptation by enhancing focus to task-relevant information,
implemented by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The CMT
suggests that the aversiveness of cognitive conflict is what
drives conflict adaptation [6]. In support of this view, stressing
the importance of negative valence in bringing about
adaptations to conflict, van Steenbergen, Band, and Hommel
[11-14] demonstrated how positive affect can counteract the
Gratton effect. Therefore, a similar but aversive teaching signal
would add to this signal [11-14] and thereby enhance conflict
adaptation, resulting in a more pronounced Gratton effect (see
also 15).
As an alternative account of cognitive control, the adaptation-
by-binding account (ABBA) of Verguts and Notebaert [16]
suggests that conflict strengthens currently active connections.
In this model, an arousal signal is sent throughout the brain
upon the detection of cognitive conflict [17], which strengthens,
through Hebbian learning, all active task-relevant connections.
By binding these associations after conflict, a smaller
congruency effect will occur on the following trial, reflected in
the Gratton effect [16,18]. The ABBA predicts that arousing
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stimuli, irrespective of their valence, would help to increase
adaptations following conflict [16]. Therefore, this account also
hypothesizes that punishment signals would enhance the
Gratton effect.
While both the CMT and ABBA focus on reactive control
(adjusting information processing after the detection of conflict),
Braver, Gray and Burgess [19] make a distinction between
proactive and reactive modes of cognitive control (Dual
Mechanisms of Control or DMC, see also 20). Whereas
proactive control refers to a more anticipatory mode of
cognitive control, where priorities are set before the occurrence
of the cognitive conflict, reactive control refers to the mode of
control driven by situational events, for example, the trial-by-
trial adaptations to cognitive conflict as described above. This
dissociation is important, because the DMC predicts that the
proactive and reactive modes of cognitive control are
differentially affected by motivational variables. Specifically, the
DMC framework predicts that rewards promote proactive
control, while punishments enhance reactive control [20-22].
Therefore, conceptualizing the Gratton effect as a
manifestation of reactive control, we can again predict that
punishments will enhance adaptations to conflict.
However, although all three models seem to predict a similar
modulation by punishment, a first study investigating the
modulation of the Gratton effect by punishment signals [3]
showed no modulation, whereas reward signals effectively
enhanced the Gratton effect [3] (see also 2). Interestingly,
Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, and Sommer [3] observed an overall
reaction time increase after punishments, rather than increased
conflict adaptation. This suggests that punishment distracted
participants from the task, similar to what happens after
participants make an error [23,24]. Consequently, it is possible
that punishments are perceived as too salient, slowing down
subsequent performance rather than increasing task focus.
As a first test of this hypothesis, we take individual
differences in sensitivity to punishment into account. As
recently stressed in a review on the influence of emotion and
motivation on cognitive conflict [25], individual differences in
sensitivity to emotional or motivational stimuli have a major
impact on how such signals modulate conflict processing.
Therefore, we hypothesized that the influence of punishment
on performance should vary as a function of punishment
sensitivity. In order to assess punishment sensitivity in the
present study, we administered the BIS- (Behavioural Inhibition
System) and BAS-scales (Behavioural Activation System [26]),
which have proven to be valuable tools in predicting how
individual differences in punishment or reward sensitivity can
modulate motivational effects on cognition (e.g., [2,11,27-32]).
We predicted that increased cognitive control following
punishment would be restricted to participants that are not
highly sensitive to punishment, while high punishment-sensitive
participants will probably not benefit or learn from punishments.
Highly punishment-sensitive people (scoring high on BIS)
perceive punishments as more aversive [29] and are more
likely to be distracted by punishments [33].
To this end, we opted to use exactly the same design as in
our reward study [2], in which a four-choice colour flanker
experiment was combined with reward signals on 25% of the
trials. Yet, instead of these rewards, we now presented
punishments. Participants were informed that 25% of the trials
could be punished. This was to keep punishment expectations
similar across participants. Yet, when participants responded
very fast and accurate, a punishment could be avoided. This
implementation of punishments ensures that punishment
signals are randomly distributed, but still performance-
contingent. In our opinion, this schedule is preferable to a
punishment schedule where the 25% slowest responses are
punished (as used in [3]). Specifically, in the design of Stürmer
and colleagues [3], an adaptive algorithm was employed to
closely monitor participants’ behaviour, allowing the
experimenters to punish the 25% slowest responses per
participant. However, because only the slowest trials were
punished, trials following punishment were confounded with
trials following slow performance, making it hard to disentangle
the effects of previous punishment presentation versus
previous task performance. In contrast, the punishment signals
in our design were randomly distributed (but still performance
related), allowing us to investigate the direct effects of
punishment presentation only.
Furthermore, we chose to present punishment signals
without an inherent affective value (we presented "-1", denoting
the loss of a point in the participants’ score). This was to
ensure that we were investigating the modulation of cognitive
control by punishment, rather than negative affect alone. For
example, when presenting a negative smiley or picture as a
punishment signal, our effect of punishment could be
confounded with an effect of negative affect that is not
punishment-induced. As argued in our previous reward study
[2], affective and reinforcement signal modulations of cognitive
control should be distinguished from one another (see also
34-36).
In sum, we administered a flanker task with performance-
contingent punishment signals and verified whether
punishment sensitivity, as measured by the BIS-scale,
modulated punishment-induced modulations of cognitive
control.
Methods
Ethic Statement
The study was approved by the ethical committee of the
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent
University. All participants signed an informed consent prior to
the experiment.
Participants
Twenty-six students took part in return for credits or 6€
(range = 18-21 years, 22 female, 22 right-handed) based on
their written informed consent with approval of the local ethical
committee and according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and Material
The flanker stimuli consisted of three horizontally aligned,
centrally presented squares that were printed in one of the four
possible colours (green, yellow, blue or red). Both flankers had
Punishment and Cognitive Control
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either the same (congruent, e.g., red-red-red) or a different
(incongruent, e.g., blue-red-blue) colour than the central
square. The stimuli were presented on a Pentium, with the use
of Tscope software [37]. A hand response box was used to
register the responses.
Procedure and Design
Participants were asked to respond to the colour of the
central square by pressing one of the four horizontally aligned
response buttons, using their index and middle fingers.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four response
mappings, which were created by shifting the colour-to-button
assignment. After a practice block of 48 trials, participants
performed 14 experimental blocks of 48 trials. For each
experimental block, an equal number of congruent and
incongruent trials were presented in a random order: 25% of
the trials were punishment trials, which were randomized for
the congruent and incongruent trials separately. Between
blocks, participants were allowed a self-paced break during
which they could see their updated score. For every ten
participants, the participant with the best score received a store
coupon worth 10€. Each subject started with a score of 300
points and could only lose points on punishment trials, as
indicated by feedback presentation in the form of "-1". Hence,
whenever seeing "-1" participants knew that they just lowered
their chances of winning a store coupon. There was no option
to gain points. All participants were truthfully instructed about
this reinforcement schedule.
First, a fixation cross was presented for 500 milliseconds,
after which the target and flanker stimuli were presented and
remained on the screen until the participant responded. The
maximum response time was 1000 milliseconds. On
punishment trials, the participant was given feedback in the
form of “-1” centrally presented on the screen for 500
milliseconds, unless he or she responded correctly faster than
350 milliseconds. In the latter case, or after a “no-punishment”
trial, a blank screen was presented for 500 milliseconds.
Finally, a blank screen was presented for 1000 milliseconds,
whereupon the next trial started.
Although participants knew from the instructions that the
punishment signals were performance-contingent, we wanted
to ensure that participants also experienced those as such. In
the reward version of this experiment [2], people missed out on
their reward on 10% of the potential rewarding trials. We
believe that this 10% is enough for participants to feel that their
reinforcement signals are performance-contingent. Therefore,
we aimed at enabling participants to escape their punishments
in 10% of the trials. In this light, the abovementioned 350
milliseconds deadline was chosen, because earlier versions of
this experiment [2] showed that only 10% of the responses
were faster than 350 milliseconds. Indeed, also in the present
experiment, participants were faster than 350 milliseconds on
only 10.8% of the trials.
Questionnaires
Immediately after the experiment, participants completed the
Behavioural Inhibition System/Behavioural Activation System
(BIS/BAS) Scales [26]. This took the form of 20 questions, such
as "I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something
important" and "When I get something I want, I feel excited and
energized", respectively examining punishment and reward
sensitivity. Seven items score punishment sensitivity, averaged
into a BIS-score, for which higher values indicate higher
punishment sensitivity. The thirteen remaining items all score
reward sensitivity (BAS-score), sometimes divided into its three
subscales: BAS Reward Responsiveness (5 items), BAS Drive
(4 items), and BAS Fun (4 items). A higher value on these
scales indicates a higher form of reward sensitivity.
Results
One participant was excluded from the analysis because of a
mean accuracy (= 0.45) two standard deviations below the
group average (M = 0.76; SD = 0.12). Trials following an error
and the first trial of each block were removed from further
analyses (24.5% of the trials). Also, trials following a trial where
the response time (RT) was faster than 350 milliseconds were
also excluded (another 8.4% of the remaining trials) to ensure
that the effect of previous feedback was not confounded with
previous RT (trials faster than 350 milliseconds were never
punished). For the RT analyses, errors were also excluded
(13.2% of the remaining trials) and from these remaining trials,
RT outliers (± 2SD of the mean reaction time calculated per
subject and per condition) were removed (2.2%). This means
that a total of 48.3% of the trials were excluded for the RT
analyses, primarily due to the relatively high error rate (24%) in
this experiment. This observed error rate is clearly higher than
the reward version of our experiment (10% [2]). Conversely,
reaction times were substantially faster (480 ms) in our
punishment experiment, as compared to the reward experiment
(530 ms). We believe that this main difference in task
performance represents an important dissociation in response
strategy elicited by the different reward and punishment
conditions (see also, 22,38). Specifically, punishments could
only be avoided by responding faster than 350 milliseconds
(and accurately), inducing a speeded response strategy, while
rewards in [2] could be obtained by responding accurately (and
faster than 1000 milliseconds), promoting a more accurate
response strategy. However, excluding this high number of
trials did not influence our main findings (removing the two
participants with less than ten data points in one condition from
the analyses did not change the significance of our analyses).
Next, we carried out an ANOVA with three within-subject
factors (congruency, previous congruency and previous
feedback), with RTs and error rates as dependent variables.
We observed a significant congruency effect, F(1,24) = 77.025,
p < .001, which interacted with previous congruency, F(1,24) =
19.686, p < .001, indicating a significant overall Gratton effect
of 23 ms (as calculated by subtracting the congruency effect
after incongruent trials from the congruency effect after
congruent trials). Although the Gratton effect after punishments
was numerically larger than the Gratton effect after no-
punishment trials (31 vs. 15 ms, respectively), this modulation
did not reach significance, F(1,24) = 2.188, p > .1. The error
rates only showed a significant congruency effect, F(1,24) =
14.698, p < .01. It could be argued that the feedback
Punishment and Cognitive Control
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presentation on punishment trials (versus blank screen on no-
punishment trials) in our experiment might have counteracted
an overall modulation of the Gratton effect. However, our
findings are in line with the study of [3], who did present
feedback after neutral trials. Furthermore, in our previous study
[2], we ran two control studies that demonstrated how
infrequent irrelevant stimulus presentations (vs. no visual
stimulation) during the inter-trial interval did not modulate
adaptations to conflict.
Next, we wanted to investigate how individual differences in
punishment sensitivity (as measured by the BIS-scale)
modulate the effect of punishment on conflict adaptation. To
this end, we ran a hierarchical linear regression analysis in
which the Gratton effect served as a dependent variable. In a
first step, previous feedback, and the standardized BIS and
BAS scores were entered, and in a second step, the interaction
between BIS and previous feedback was included. As
expected, the three variables BIS, BAS, and previous feedback
(Model 1) did not significantly contribute to the regression
model of the Gratton effect. The model accounts for R2 = 8.2
%, F(3,46) = 1.365, p > .1. Adding the interaction variable
(Model 2), we observed a significant ΔR2 of 7.7%, ΔF(1,45) =
4.126, p < .05, denoting that the interaction between BIS and
previous feedback was a significant predictor of the Gratton
effect, after having controlled for the effects of BAS, BIS, and
previous feedback. This relation between BIS, previous
feedback and the Gratton effect is depicted in Figure 1, where
the correlation between the modulation of the Gratton effect (as
calculated by subtracting the Gratton effect after no-
punishment trials from the Gratton effect after punishment
trials) and participants’ punishment sensitivity is plotted
(Spearman’s rho correlation, ρ = -.455, p < .05). No
Spearman’s rho correlations were observed with the BAS-
scale, or any of its subscales.
To further investigate the role of punishment sensitivity in the
modulation of the Gratton effect, we decided to split up our
subjects in a low and high punishment-sensitive group by
means of a median-split analysis on participants’ BIS-score:
participants with a BIS-score lower than 24 were assigned to
the low punishment-sensitive group and participants with a
BIS-score of 24 or higher were assigned to the high
punishment-sensitive group. Note that the mean BIS-score
(20.2) for the low punishment-sensitive group is actually similar
to the average BIS-scores collected from large community
samples, which are typically between 19 and 22 [39,40]. The
mean BIS-score (25) for the high punishment-sensitive group
on the other hand, can be considered relatively high. Next, we
re-analysed our data with punishment sensitivity as a between-
subjects factor.
Figure 1.  The scatter plot shows the correlation between individual scores on the BIS scale and the difference scores
for the Gratton effects.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074106.g001
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In line with the observed correlation, we found a four-way
interaction between congruency, previous congruency,
previous feedback, and punishment sensitivity in reaction
times, F(1,23) = 6.680, p < .05. Interestingly, the error rates
showed a similar trend, F(1,23) = 3.253, p = .084. No other
effects of punishment sensitivity were observed (all ps > .1).
In order to gain further insight in these behavioural
differences between both punishment sensitivity groups, we
conducted ANOVAs for each punishment sensitivity group
separately. As depicted in Figure 2, the low punishment-
sensitive group showed a modulation of the Gratton effect,
F(1,11) = 6.269, p < .05: the Gratton effect after punishment
trials (41 ms) was more pronounced than the Gratton effect
after no-punishment trials (0 ms; this absence of a Gratton
effect after no-punishment trials will be discussed in the
general discussion). The high punishment-sensitive group, on
the contrary, showed an overall significant Gratton effect,
F(1,12) = 10.511, p < .01, that was not modulated by previous
feedback, F(1,12) < 1. However, a main effect of previous
feedback indicated that the high punishment-sensitive group
did show a general slowing after punishments, F(1,12) =
11.443, p < .01, whereas the low punishment-sensitive group
did not, F(1,11) = 0.004, p > .1. The modulation of the Gratton
effect per punishment-sensitivity group in the error rates, as
well as each Gratton effect separately, garnered no significant
results in both conditions, but followed a numerically similar
trend as the reaction times, as summarized in Table 1.
Alternatively, instead of exploring the four-way interaction
between congruency, previous congruency, previous feedback,
and punishment sensitivity, by looking at the separate
punishment-sensitivity groups, we also performed analyses on
the effects of punishment sensitivity on the Gratton effect, after
punishment and no-punishment trials separately. The Gratton
effect after punishment was not significantly larger in the low
punishment-sensitive than in the high punishment-sensitive
group, F(1,23) = 1.275, p > .1. After no-punishment trials,
however, the Gratton effect was significantly smaller in the low
punishment-sensitive group than in the high punishment-
sensitive group, F(1,23) = 8.991, p < .01. This interaction hints
at differences in the respective Gratton effects. Therefore, we
tested the Gratton effects in all four conditions separately. The
Gratton effect after punishment reached marginal significance,
F(1,12) = 3.413, p = .089, in the high punishment-sensitive
group (21 ms), and significance, F(1,11) = 9.459, p < .05, in the
low punishment-sensitive group (41 ms). The Gratton effect
after no-punishment trials in the high punishment-sensitive
group (29 ms) was also significant, F(1,12) = 21.516, p < .01,
while this Gratton effect in the low punishment-sensitive group
(0 ms) was not, F(1,11) = 0.001, p > .1.
Discussion
In line with previous studies [3], a group analysis of the
current study suggested that punishment signals do not
influence adaptations to conflict. However, by taking into
account individual differences in punishment sensitivity, we
have demonstrated how punishment can have an effect on
cognitive control, depending on the punishment’s perceived
severity. Participants low in punishment-sensitivity showed an
enhanced Gratton effect after punished trials. Participants high
in punishment-sensitivity showed no such modulation. Instead,
highly punishment-sensitive participants slowed down after
punishments.
Our results clearly stress the importance of taking into
account individual differences when studying the role of
motivational variables in modulating cognitive control [25].
Especially when investigating motivational or emotional
influences on cognitive control, individual differences in
sensitivity can help expose underlying mechanisms of how
these variables influence cognitive adaptations (e.g.,
[2,12,27-32]). For example, using electrophysiological
recordings, De Pascalis, Varriale, and D’Antuono [31]
demonstrated a higher feedback-related negativity following
punishments as a function of participants’ BIS-score. Boksem
and colleagues [29] investigated the influence of punishment
sensitivity (as measured by the BIS-scale) on behavioural
adaptations after punished performance errors and
demonstrated how high punishment-sensitive people show
more slowing after punishments than low punishment-sensitive
people do. Our results add to these findings by demonstrating
that punishments can also promote adaptive behaviour, as long
as people are not too sensitive to punishments.
Surprisingly, in the low punishment-sensitive group, the
modulation of the Gratton effect was not only reflected in a
larger Gratton effect after punishments, but also an absent
Gratton effect after no-punishment trials. This finding is in line
with earlier studies investigating motivational effects on
cognitive control, in that these studies also demonstrated how
the motivationally less significant condition is not the neutral
and constant baseline as sometimes assumed (e.g., [2,41-43]).
Instead, by introducing a motivationally significant
reinforcement signal, a context is created where both
punishment and no-punishment trials receive an informative
value: by increasing the motivational value of punishment trials
the value of no-punishment trials is simultaneously decreased.
At first sight, our findings might sound counterintuitive in
suggesting that higher sensitivity to a reinforcement signal is
associated with lower benefits of this reinforcement signal on
task-adaptive behavior. Instead, task-performance seems to be
impeded, rather than promoted after punishment for high
punishment-sensitive people. Therefore, we believe our results
Table 1. Mean error rate (%) as a function of previous
congruency, current congruency and preceding feedback
for each punishment sensitivity group differently.
 low punishment-sensitive group  high punishment-sensitive group
n-1 n
after
punishment
after no-
punishment  
after
punishment
after no-
punishment
C C 16.8 19.5  18.5 15.0
 I 25.4 23.3  21.9 22.1
I C 21.6 19.8  13.6 17.3
 I 22.9 23.4  24.4 21.5
Note: C = congruent; I = incongruent; n - 1 = preceding trial; n = current trial.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074106.t001
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might reflect the right hand side of an inverted-U shaped
function between punishment saliency and task performance.
Too often, existing theories of cognitive psychology assume a
linear, more-is-better effect of cognitive variables (e.g.,
medication, reward, working memory capacity, etc.) on
performance, whereas both empirical progress [44] and
evolution theory [45] have indicated it is wise to assume a
curvilinear, inverted U-shape function. Our findings corroborate
this idea: by taking into account punishment sensitivity, we
demonstrated how we are able to flexibly adapt our behaviour
after punishments, as long as they do not overwhelm us.
Specifically, our findings could be framed within the Yerkes-
Dodson law [46], which suggests that there is an inverted U-
shaped relation between arousal and task performance.
Reinforcement signals that are too arousing will decrease,
rather than increase, task performance. We can interpret our
data as an extension of the Yerkes-Dodson law, in the sense
that not only general task performance is modulated by a
curvilinear function of arousal, but also cognitive control is (i.e.,
Figure 2.  The reaction times for each punishment-sensitive group separately.  The figure demonstrates how punishment
helps in adapting to conflict, for low punishment-sensitive people, while people high in punishment sensitivity slow down after
punishment. The error bars are ± 1 standard error.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074106.g002
Punishment and Cognitive Control
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e74106
trial-to-trial adaptations to conflict). This, however, does not
mean that our findings can exclusively be explained in terms of
the ABBA, which describes adaptations to conflict as a function
of (conflict-induced) arousal [16]. In fact, the arousing value of
a punishment might as well directly impact the experienced
aversiveness [6] or the saliency with which it will promote
reactive control [20].
We suggest that for the low punishment-sensitive group of
participants that showed an enhanced Gratton effect following
punishment signals, punishments induced the appropriate
levels of saliency for increasing cognitive control. This
modulation could reflect an enhanced strengthening of task
relevant associations [16,18], a modulation of task attention
[6,7], or a shift from a more proactive to a more reactive control
modus [20,21], after punishment. However, participants highly
sensitive to punishment showed no modulation of the Gratton
effect after punishment, suggesting that arousal levels were too
high to modulate cognitive control processes. These
participants showed an overall increase in response latencies
following punishment. This finding is in line with [3]. Similarly,
Padmala, Bauer, and Pessoa [47] showed how arbitrarily
presenting highly arousing negative pictures (i.e., pictures of
mutilated corpses) in between Stroop trials, elicited an overall
reaction time slowing, and even a reduced conflict adaptation
effect.
A similar inverted U-shaped relationship between
aversiveness and performance has also been proposed in the
literature investigating block-wise manipulations of conflict
adaptation. For example, while van Steenbergen and
colleagues [12,13] demonstrated how conflict adaptation can
be increased under a negative mood manipulation (either
music/imagination- or medicine-induced), Meiran, Diamond,
Todor, and Nemets [48] showed how individuals with major
depressive disorder show decreased, rather than increased,
conflict adaptation. In reviewing these discrepancies in results,
van Steenbergen and colleagues [13] concluded that negative
mood can help promoting adaptations to conflict, but only up to
a certain level. When being experienced as too high to cope
with, negative mood can lead people to disengage from the
task, resulting in decreased conflict adaptation [48]. This is also
consistent with the mood-behavior model of Gendolla [49]
which states that the relation between mood and effort
mobilization is nonlinear.
The overall differential influence of punishment and reward
signals, in that reward signals modulate adaptations to conflict
[3,2] while punishment signals do not ( [3] and our overall
analysis), could also be attributed to a difference in arousal
levels induced by both reinforcement signal types. For
example, keeping everything else equal, Gomez and McLaren
[38] systematically examined the effects of reward and
punishment signals and demonstrated how punishment
schedules (as opposed to reward schedules) induced higher
overall arousal levels, as measured by the skin conductance
response. Similarly, comparing appetitive with aversive
motivational systems, Tranel [50] demonstrated how the latter
was associated with an increased skin conductance response,
while the former was not. These findings are also consistent
with the more general idea of a negativity bias, which relates to
the finding that people tend to pay more attention and give
more weight to negative, as compared to positive experiences
[51,52].
In fact, this apparent different impact of rewards and
punishments may reflect a similar difference observed between
post-conflict and post-error behavioural adjustments. While
cognitive conflict seems to help task focus, errors elicit an
orienting response, causing an overall slowing rather than
enhanced performance [53]. Interestingly, both post-error and
post-conflict processes have been linked to arousal (e.g.,
[3,17,24,54,55]), yet conflict-induced arousal, although reliable,
seems to be substantially smaller than error-induced arousal
[17]. Similar to error processing, we suggest that people highly
sensitive to punishment may have experienced a short-lived
orienting response [23,24] towards the punishment signal, but
away from the task, reflecting a failure to disengage from the
punishment. Analogously, it has been demonstrated that high
punishment-sensitive people attend longer to aversive stimuli
and have difficulty disengaging attention from these stimuli
[33].
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